The authors examined change in cognitive abilities in older Catholic clergy members. For up to 6 years, participants underwent annual clinical evaluations, which included a battery of tests from which summary measures of 7 abilities were derived. On average, decline occurred in each ability and was more rapid in older persons than in younger persons. However, wide individual differences were evident at all ages. Rate of change in a given domain was not strongly related to baseline level of function in that domain but was moderately associated with rates of change in other cognitive domains. The results suggest that change in cognitive function in old age primarily reflects person-specific factors rather than an inevitable developmental process.
Longitudinal studies have shown that, on average, cognition declines in old age (Colsher & Wallace, 1991; Evans et al., 1993; Wilson, Beckett, Bennett, Albert, & Evans, 1999) . On an individual level, however, wide variability is seen (Christensen et al., 1999; Wilson et al., 1999) . In some people cognition declines precipitously, but in many others cognition declines only slightly or not at all, or improves slightly. Determining the factors that contribute to this variability is likely to require detailed knowledge about individual differences in patterns of change in different cognitive abilities in old age. Unfortunately, such knowledge is currently limited, owing to several factors.
One factor is that few longitudinal studies have been designed to model change in individuals. The ability to do so depends not only on observing people for a sufficiently long period but also on the number and spacing of observations during that period. Yet most longitudinal studies of cognition in older people have only two observations, and few have more than three (e.g., Fozard, Vercruyssen, Reynolds, Hancock, & Quilter, 1994; Jacqmin-Gadda, Fabrigoule, Commenges, & Dartigues, 1997; Schaie, 1996; Siegler, 1983; Wilson et al., 1999) . Such designs can yield accurate estimates of change at the group level, but they make it difficult to reliably separate random variability from personspecific patterns of change. Further, intervals between observations have ranged from about 6 months to well over a decade. However, cognition can decline rapidly in older persons, and individuals experiencing such precipitous decline may be lost to follow-up in studies with intervals of more than 3 or 4 years between observations (e.g., Gold et al., 1995; Owens, 1966; Schaie, 1996; Zelinski & Burnight, 1997) .
A second issue is the extent to which some forms of cognition are more likely to change in old age than are other forms. In cross-sectional studies, age-associated differences are typically large in episodic memory and processing abilities such as working memory and perceptual speed but are minimal in crystallized verbal abilities such as vocabulary and reading recognition (Horn, 1968; Salthouse, 1988) . Unfortunately, some longitudinal studies have used only global measures of cognition, obscuring a potential source of individual differences (e.g., Albert et al., 1995; Brayne, Gill, Paykel, Huppert, & O'Connor, 1995; Deeg, Hofman, & van Zonneveld, 1990; Farmer, Kittner, Rae, Bartko, & Reiger, 1995; Feskens et al., 1994; Izaks, Gussekloo, Dermout, Heeren, & Ligthart, 1995; Jacqmin-Gadda et al., 1997; Lyketsos, Chen, & Anthony, 1999; Unger, van Belle, & Heyman, 1999; Wilson et al., 1999) .
Another issue is that because older people differ widely not only in level of cognitive function but also in rate of change, longitudinal studies require outcome measures that assess an especially wide range of ability. Use of composite measures constructed from individual cognitive tests that vary in difficulty level can reduce the likelihood that floor or ceiling effects and other sources of measurement error will distort estimates of change. Unfortunately, relatively few longitudinal studies have used composite cognitive outcome measures (but see Albert et al., 1995; Hultsch, Hertzog, Dixon, & Small, 1998; Malec, Smith, Ivnik, Peterson, & Tangalos, 1996; Schaie, 1996; Wilson et al., 1999) .
The ability to characterize individual differences in change in cognitive function also depends on maintaining a high rate of follow-up participation among survivors. Because attrition in longitudinal cognitive function studies is nonrandom and is generally found to be related not only to cognitive performance but also to key predictors (e.g., age and education; Hultsch et al., 1998; Schaie, 1996; Siegler & Botwinick, 1979) , it limits both the range of individual differences and the ability to identify contributing factors. Yet rates of follow-up participation vary widely in longitudinal studies or cannot be determined from published information. The proportion of participants available for longitudinal analyses is sometimes further reduced by analytic approaches that require equal numbers of observations per individual (e.g., Colsher & Wallace, 1991; Emery, Pedersen, Svartengren, & McClern, 1998; Hopp, Dixon, Grut, & Backman, 1997; McCarty, Siegler, & Logue, 1982; B. J. Small, Dixon, Hultsch, & Hertzog, 1999) .
In this study, we examined change in cognitive function over a 6-year period in a large cohort of older persons. Participants were Catholic clergy members who were 65 years and older and free of clinical evidence of Alzheimer's disease at baseline. They underwent annual clinical evaluations with over 95% participation in follow-up among survivors. Each evaluation included administration of 21 cognitive function tests and clinical classification of Alzheimer's disease and other common conditions of old age. Based in part on a factor analysis of the baseline data, summary measures of seven cognitive abilities were formed.
Longitudinal analyses addressed four basic issues about cognitive function in old age. The first aim was to characterize individual paths of change in each cognitive domain and then to examine the variability in these paths. That is, in this relatively homogeneous group of healthy, high-functioning older persons, does individual cognitive change follow a regular path, suggesting a homogeneous aging process, or are individual paths more varied? We used random-effects regression models to assess change. In this approach, change is modeled at both the individual level and the group level. Change in an individual is assumed to follow the mean path of change in the group, except for random effects that cause the initial level of function to be higher or lower and the rate of change to be faster or slower. We used these random effects to estimate individual growth curves, which were then plotted and examined for variability.
A second aim was to see how much of the variability in rates of change in cognitive function could be explained by knowledge of a person's baseline level of function. Most research on cognitive function in old age is cross-sectional. It is important to know, therefore, how cross-sectional information about age-related differences in cognitive performance is related to observed differences in rate of change. Information about this association is limited, however, because initial level of function has usually been viewed only as a source of bias in estimating change. An advantage of the growth-curve approach used in this study is that initial level of function and rate of change are treated as separate random effects, and the correlation between them is explicitly estimated by the models.
A third aim was to see the extent to which change in different cognitive abilities covaried over the study period. Crosssectional studies have indirectly examined this issue by comparing the amount of age-related variance on tests of different abilities and by estimating how much of that variance is shared, but interpretation of these data has varied (Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997; Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994; Rabbitt, 1993; Salthouse, Fristoe, & Rhee, 1996; Verhaegen & Salthouse, 1997) . Longitudinal studies can directly examine this issue, but few have done so, and their results have been inconsistent. In the Victoria Longitudinal Study, rates of change over 6 years on nine composite measures of specific cognitive functions were moderately intercorrelated, and a general cognitive change factor accounted for most of the covariation on specific cognitive measures (Hultsch et al., 1998) . By contrast, in the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging, rates of change in older persons over periods ranging from approximately 5 to 25 years on individual tests of semantic memory (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Vocabulary subtest) and episodic memory (Benton Visual Retention Test) were not significantly correlated (Arenberg, 1978; Giambra, Arenberg, Zonderman, Kawas, & Costa, 1995) . In another longitudinal study, rates of change over 4 years on tests of perceptual speed (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Digit Symbol subtest) and episodic memory (Buschke selective reminding) were not significantly correlated in a cohort of 30 older persons (Taylor, Miller, & Tinklenberg, 1992) .
The final aim of this study was to assess practice effects. In longitudinal studies, repeated experience (or practice) with cognitive tests often results in improved performance, making it difficult to know the actual level of change that has occurred. Many longitudinal studies have used alternative forms in an effort to reduce practice effects (Giambra et al., 1995; Hertzog, Dixon, & Hultsch, 1992; Hultsch et al., 1998; Prince, Lewis, Bird, Blizard, & Mann, 1996; Youngjohn & Crook, 1993) . Unfortunately, alternative forms do not eliminate practice effects (Dikmen, Heaton, Grant, & Temkin, 1999; Hultsch et al., 1998; Watson, Pasteur, Healy, & Hughes, 1994) , suggesting that factors other than learning test content must be contributing (e.g., improved test-taking skills, reduced anxiety). In longitudinal studies, alternative forms add another source of variability to individual paths of change, thereby complicating efforts to characterize how people differ. In this study, the same cognitive tests were administered at annual intervals. We constructed a series of models to see how this experience affected our estimates of the average level of change in each domain and of how change in a given domain was related to initial level of function in that domain and rate of change in other domains.
Method

Participants
Participants were part of the Religious Order Study, an ongoing longitudinal clinical-pathological study of aging and Alzheimer's disease in older Catholic nuns, priests, and brothers. Participants were recruited from more than 30 groups across the country (see the author note). Eligibility required (a) age of 65 years or older, (b) absence of evidence of dementia or Alzheimer's disease, and (c) consent to annual clinical evaluations and to brain donation at the time of death. Recruitment began in January 1994 and is ongoing. The study was approved by the Human Investigations Committee of Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center.
Analyses were based on 694 persons who completed the baseline clinical evaluation between January 1994 and June 2000 and were found not to meet clinical criteria for dementia or Alzheimer's disease (see the Clinical Evaluation section). At baseline, mean age was 75.9 years (SD ϭ 6.9), mean education was 18.1 years (SD ϭ 3.3), and mean score on the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) was 28.3 (SD ϭ 1.7). There were 443 women and 251 men; 652 participants were White, 39 were Black, and 3 belonged to other racial groups.
Clinical Evaluation
At baseline, each person had a structured, uniform evaluation, which was repeated annually with examiners who were unaware of previously collected data. The evaluation included a medical history, a neurological examination, an assessment of cognitive function (see the Assessment of Cognitive Function section), and a review of a brain scan when available. Following this evaluation, a board-certified neurologist classified persons with respect to Alzheimer's disease and other common neurologic disorders as previously described (Bennett, Shannon, Beckett, Goetz, & Wilson, 1997; Kordower et al., 2001; Mufson et al., 1999) . In short, the diagnoses of dementia and Alzheimer's disease followed the criteria set forth by the joint working group of the National Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke and the Alzheimer's Disease and Related Disorders Association (NINCDS/ADRDA criteria; McKhann et al., 1984) . At baseline, 48 people met NINCDS/ADRDA criteria for dementia (history of cognitive decline and impairment in at least two cognitive domains), and they are excluded from all analyses in this article. Of these 48 people, 39 met NINCDS/ADRDA criteria for probable Alzheimer's disease, and 9 met criteria for possible Alzheimer's disease because another condition was felt to contribute to cognitive impairment (3 with stroke and 2 with Parkinson's disease) or because memory was not impaired (n ϭ 4).
Assessment of Cognitive Function
A battery of 21 cognitive function tests was administered at each evaluation by examiners who had an average of 5 weeks of training and were certified on each test using performance-based criteria. Data were collected on laptop computers with forms programmed in Blaise (Central Bureau of Statistics, Voorburg, the Netherlands), a Pascal-based data-entry program, and scored in SAS (SAS Institute, 2000) .
One test, the MMSE, provided a measure of global cognitive function that was used only for descriptive purposes. Scores on a test of auditory comprehension, Complex Ideational Material , were highly skewed, and this test was dropped from all subsequent analyses, which were based on the remaining 19 tests.
Of 7 episodic memory tests, 4 involved story retention: immediate and delayed recall of the East Boston Story (Albert et al., 1991) and of Story A from Logical Memory of the Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1987) . Three tests involved learning and retaining a 10-word list (Morris et al., 1989) : Word List Memory is the total number of words immediately recalled after each of three consecutive presentations of the list; Word List Recall is the number of words recalled after an approximately 3-min delay; and Word List Recognition is the number of words correctly recognized in a four-alternative, forced-choice format, administered after Word List Recall.
Four tests assessed semantic memory. Two measures required generating words in response to pictorial or semantic stimuli. On a 20-item version of the Boston Naming Test (Kaplan, Goodglass, & Weintraub, 1983) , participants were asked to produce the names of pictured objects. Verbal Fluency involved generating exemplars from two semantic categories (animals; fruits and vegetables) in separate 1-min trials. The total number of unique exemplars was the performance measure. Two tasks assessed word knowledge. On the Extended Range Vocabulary Test (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Kermen, 1976) , participants were asked to select the best definition for each target word from five alternatives; 15 items selected from Parts 1 and 2 of the original test were administered. On the Reading Test, participants were asked to read aloud a series of 20 words with atypical spelling-sound correspondences (e.g., debt). The words were selected from the National Adult Reading Test (Nelson, 1982) and its subsequent modifications (Blair & Spreen, 1989; Grober & Sliwinski, 1991) .
Four measures of working memory were given. The Digit Span Forward and Digit Span Backward subtests were administered and scored following Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised procedures (Wechsler, 1987) . On Digit Ordering, participants were read sequences of two to nine digits, with two items at each length, and asked to say them back in ascending order. Items were scored as correct or incorrect, and administration was discontinued when participants failed both items at a given length. The span format and binary scoring of items are departures from the original version of this test (Cooper & Sagar, 1993; Cooper et al., 1992; Cooper, Sagar, Jordan, Harvey, & Sullivan, 1991) . On Alpha Span, sequences of two to eight words were presented, with two items at each length, and participants tried to say them back in alphabetical order (Craik, 1986) . Administration was discontinued when participants failed both items at a given length.
Two measures of perceptual speed were used. On the oral version of the Symbol Digit Modalities Test (Smith, 1982) , participants had 90 s to identify as many digit-symbol matches as possible. On Number Comparison (Ekstrom et al., 1976) , participants classified pairs of 3-to 10-digit sequences as same or different. The performance measure was the number of pairs correctly classified in 90 s minus the number incorrectly classified.
Two measures of visuospatial ability were administered. Judgment of Line Orientation (Benton, Sivan, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1994) required participants to estimate the angle subtended by two lines in a match-to-sample format. Fifteen of the original 30 items were used. On the Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1992) , participants were shown an abstract visual display with one element missing and asked to select the missing element from an array of six to eight alternatives. Seventeen items were used from a total of 60 in the original test.
To enhance the applicability of the visual tests with older participants, stimuli were enlarged for the Boston Naming Test, Symbol Digit Modalities Test, Number Comparison, Judgment of Line Orientation, and Standard Progressive Matrices.
Data Analysis
We first obtained univariate descriptions of the scores, both graphical and computed, for each test in each year. Because some of these distributions were relatively skewed and because of the importance of minimizing floor and ceiling effects in longitudinal analyses, we used composites of 2 or more tests as outcomes. We developed these composite measures in a three-step process. First, we specified two conceptually based groupings of the tests into functional domains. Second, we developed an empirically based grouping of the tests by (a) performing a principal-components factor analysis, with varimax rotation, of the 19 tests at baseline and (b) grouping tests together with rotated factor loadings of .50 or higher on a
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common factor. Any test without a factor loading of .50 or higher was grouped empirically into its own one-test domain. We used baseline data to develop the empirical grouping because the cohort was most disease free at this point. Third, to assess the agreement of each conceptually based grouping with the empirically based grouping, we used Rand's statistic (Rand, 1971) , rescaled from Ϫ1 to ϩ1 to be comparable to Kendall's tau, another measure that calculates proportion of pairs concordant minus proportion discordant. Two groupings were considered to agree on a pair of tests if both groupings put the tests in the same cluster or if both groupings put the tests in different clusters; two groupings were considered to disagree if one grouping put a pair of tests in the same cluster and the other grouping put them in different clusters (Bennett, Shannon, Beckett, & Wilson, 1999) . We scored the agreement of each conceptual model with the data-driven grouping across all pairs of tests, scoring agreement as ϩ1 and disagreement as Ϫ1 and averaging the scores to yield an overall index of agreement. This index can range from perfect agreement (ϩ1) to perfect disagreement (Ϫ1). Strong agreement between the data-driven grouping and a given conceptual model was taken as support for using the conceptual domains in analyses. We used a permutation test to see if a given level of agreement could have been obtained by chance alone. We calculated the agreement that would be obtained for all groupings of the same pattern as the empirical grouping (number of groups, number of tests per group) for all possible permutations of the tests. We then computed what fraction of the permutations gave agreement with the conceptual grouping as high as that from the empirical grouping, and this fraction formed the p value based on the permutation test. An advantage of this approach is that it does not assume multivariate normality, which was an important consideration given the negatively skewed distributions of some individual test scores at baseline. The next goal of the analysis was to characterize change in cognitive function over the study period within each of the domains. We used a growth-curve approach, fitting random-effects regression models (Laird & Ware, 1982) . These models enabled us to estimate the mean path of change in each domain and to characterize how individual paths differed from the mean trajectory. This approach has been used in several previous longitudinal studies of cognitive function (Berg et al., 1992; Hebert et al., 2000; Jacqmin-Gadda et al., 1997; Teri, Hughes, & Larson, 1990; Wilson et al., 1999; Wilson, Bennett, Gilley, Beckett, Barnes, & Evans, 2000; Wilson, Bennett, Gilley, Beckett, Schneider, & Evans, 2000b; and other behavioral outcomes (Gibbons et al., 1993; Wilson, Bennett, Gilley, Beckett, Schneider, & Evans, 2000a) . Practical advantages of this approach are that individuals need not have the same number of observations and the time between observations is not assumed to be constant within or between persons.
The core model had three predictors: age (at baseline), time (in years) since baseline, and their interaction. To ease interpretation of results, we centered age at 75 years, the round number closest to the mean age of the cohort, which means that the reference person for analyses is a 75-year-old. The coefficient for age indicates the average effect on cognitive score of being 1 year older (or younger) than 75 at baseline, which can be thought of as the cross-sectional effect of age. The coefficient for time indicates the average effect of 1 year of study time on cognitive score for a 75-year-old, which can be viewed as the longitudinal effect of age. The interaction of age and time indicates the extent to which annual rate of change varies with each year of baseline age above or below 75. In secondary analyses, we added a quadratic term for age to the core model to see if the association of age with cognitive function at baseline had a nonlinear component.
To assess heterogeneity in individual paths of change, we examined the distribution of the model estimates of the individual slopes in each cognitive domain. We also used the estimated intercepts and slopes to construct individual growth curves, which were plotted.
The model also provided an estimate of the correlation between the person-specific intercepts and slopes in each domain, which we used to see how much of the variability in annual change between persons could be accounted for by differences in baseline level of function. To assess the covariation in change among different cognitive abilities, we computed the correlations among the person-specific slopes in each domain of function and performed a principal-components factor analysis on these slopes.
The final analytic goal was to examine practice effects, which we defined as changes in performance that could be attributed to prior experience with the tests and the testing situation. Because previous research suggests that most of the benefits of practice result from initial testing experiences (Jacqmin-Gadda et al., 1997; Unger et al., 1999) , we initially constructed a random-effects model, which we designated as Model 1, with terms for time; for the contrast between the baseline and the mean of all follow-up evaluations, to estimate the average effect of the first practice experience (at baseline); and for the contrast between the first follow-up and the mean of all subsequent follow-up evaluations, to estimate the additional average effect of the second practice experience.
We further examined the effects of practice in secondary analyses. First, we added a second follow-up term to Model 1 to assess the incremental effect of the third testing experience. Second, we constructed another set of random-effects models, each with a term for time. We then compared the coefficients for time from these models with those obtained from Model 1 to see how practice influenced our estimate of the average annual change in each domain. Third, we used person-specific intercepts and slopes from Model 1 to estimate the correlations of initial level with rate of change in each domain and the correlations among rates of change in different domains. We then compared these correlations with those obtained from the core model to see how practice influenced our estimates of these associations.
We used SAS PROC MIXED (SAS Institute, 2000) to estimate the parameters of the random-effects models. The models assume a linear association of predictors with outcomes. We checked this assumption analytically, by adding a quadratic term for age to the core model, and graphically, by plotting residuals against age. We assessed model assumptions about normality, independence of errors, and homoscedasticity of errors by plotting the estimated intercepts by slopes, by plotting residuals from each time point, and by examining selected summary statistics. We concluded that model assumptions were adequately met. To construct composite measures from these individual tests for use in longitudinal analyses, we began by hypothesizing two ways of grouping tests into functional domains (Groupings 1 and 2 in Table 1 ). In one grouping, we specified five domains: episodic memory, semantic memory, working memory, perceptual speed, and visuospatial ability. In the second grouping, we specified seven domains. We subdivided episodic memory tests into storyretention and word-retention clusters because some longitudinal studies have reported that practice effects are more pronounced on the former than the latter (McCarty et al., 1982; B. J. Small, Dixon, et al., 1999) . We subdivided semantic memory tests into wordgeneration and word-knowledge clusters because of crosssectional evidence that age-related differences are more pronounced on the former than the latter (Burke & Peters, 1986; MacKay, Abrams, & Pedroza, 1999; Nelson, 1982; Salthouse, 1993; Troyer, Moscovitch, & Winocur, 1997) .
Results
Development of Cognitive Function Measures
We next developed an empirically based grouping of the tests by performing a principal-components factor analysis (with varimax rotation) on the 19 tests at baseline. The analysis, summarized on the right side of Table 1 , identified five factors. We then grouped together the tests that loaded .50 or higher on a common factor. As shown in Table 1 , the grouping based on the factor analysis was similar to both of the hypothesized groupings. We calculated an index of agreement between the two groupings using Rand's measure, rescaled to range from Ϫ1 (complete discordance between the two groupings) to ϩ1 (complete concordance between the two groupings). The overall agreement of the factor analytic grouping with the five-domain grouping was .79 and with the seven-domain grouping was .84 (both ps Ͻ .01), providing empirical support for both hypothesized groupings. We chose the seven-domain grouping because the fit was slightly better and because we wanted to examine change within the subdivisions of episodic and semantic memory.
Summary measures of each of the seven cognitive domains were formed, as in previous research , by converting raw scores on each component test to z scores, using the baseline mean and standard deviation, and then averaging the z scores of the component tests in that domain. If component scores were missing, the domain score was missing unless at least half of the component tests had valid scores, in which case the domain score was based on the valid test scores. Table 2 shows the baseline mean, standard deviation, and range for the seven cognitive domain scores.
Follow-Up Participation
Of the 694 eligible participants, 25 died before the first follow-up evaluation, and another 57 had not yet reached their first follow-up date. Therefore, 612 persons were eligible for follow-up at the time of these analyses. Information about follow-up participation is summarized in Table 3 . Longitudinal analyses required a minimum of two valid scores per individual, and 596 to 601 persons met this criterion for each of the cognitive domain scores, over 97% of those eligible for follow-up. Among those individuals with follow-up data, there was an average of more than five observations per individual (range two to seven), which represented over 96% of possible scores.
Average Paths of Change
Random-effects models were used to summarize cross-sectional and longitudinal information about the average paths of change in each cognitive domain. The primary model included terms for age (at baseline), study time (in years), and their interaction. The term for age is a cross-sectional estimate of the effect of being a year older at baseline. The term for time is a longitudinal estimate of the effect of getting a year older during the study. Their interaction denotes whether cognitive change per year varies with baseline age. Separate analyses were conducted for each of the cognitive domain measures (see Table 4 ). On average, performance in each domain declined over the study period (as shown by the terms for time). Thus, the story-retention measure declined an average of 0.030 units per year (95% confidence interval [CI]: Ϫ0.045 to Ϫ0.016). There was also an inverse relation between age and baseline score on each measure. Thus, the baseline story-retention score was reduced by an average of 0.031 units for each additional year of baseline age beyond 75 (95% CI: Ϫ0.039 to Ϫ0.023). The average change in baseline score per year of age was roughly comparable to the average annual decline observed over the study period. That is, in each domain except working memory, the 95% CIs for the effects of a year of age at baseline and a year of observation in the study overlapped, although the degree of overlap was minimal for word generation and word knowledge.
The average rate of change in each cognitive domain was related to baseline age (as shown by the interaction terms in Table 4 ). On the story-retention measure, for example, the average annual rate of decline increased by 0.008 units for each additional year of baseline age beyond 75. In a typical 85-year-old participant, therefore, story retention declined 0.110 units annually compared with an average loss of 0.030 units per year in a 75-year-old and an average gain of 0.050 units per year in a 65-year-old.
To see if the association of age with cognitive function at baseline also had a nonlinear component, we repeated the randomeffects models, adding a quadratic term for age. This term was significant for word knowledge (parameter estimate ϭ Ϫ0.002; 95% CI: Ϫ0.003 to Ϫ0.001) but not for the other cognitive domain measures, indicating that the association of age and cognition at baseline was mostly linear, unlike the association of age with rate of change in cognitive function.
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of age in each cognitive domain. Figure 1 shows baseline scores in each domain plotted by age at baseline, with a linear regression line added. In each domain, there was an approximately linear association between lower performance and increased age, with correlations ranging from Ϫ.10 (word knowledge) to Ϫ.45 (word generation). A slight ceiling effect on the word-knowledge measure can be seen in Figure 1 , and this effect probably limited its linear association with age. For Figure 2 , we divided the age range into 5-year intervals and then estimated the average change during the study for a typical participant followed for 5-years from the beginning of a given interval. In contrast to the mistaken interference about rate of change that might be drawn from the cross-sectional results shown in Figure 1 (that change is similar across age), Figure 2 demonstrates that the average rate of decline in each domain increased with increasing baseline age. In each domain, little decline was observed in 65-and 70-year-old persons, whereas substantial decline was seen in 80-and 85-year-old persons.
Heterogeneity in Paths of Change
To examine individual patterns of change, we constructed models with terms for time for each cognitive domain score. We first estimated each person's slope (i.e., annual rate of change) in each domain. The distributions of these slopes, shown in Figure 3 , were roughly symmetric and suggest considerable variability among persons. The smoothed person-specific curves estimated from these models are shown in Figure 4 . So that individual paths could be distinguished, the plots were constructed for a 25% random sample of the cohort. Figure 4 is organized according to the age of the participant at each evaluation; the length of each line relative to the x-axis indicates the years of observation on that individual. Overall, substantial heterogeneity is evident in each cognitive domain, with a few people exhibiting a precipitous decline and most people remaining stable or declining or improving slightly. Although decline in each domain appears to be more common in older persons than in younger persons, variability is evident at all ages. Figure 4 also illustrates a relative absence of floor and ceiling effects, except for a ceiling effect on the word-knowledge measure (see also Figure 1) . It also appears in Figure 4 that baseline level of function is not strongly related to rate of change. To further investigate this effect, we computed the correlations of the person-specific intercepts (i.e., initial levels of function) with the person-specific slopes in each domain. These correlations were as follows: word retention (r ϭ .53), story retention (r ϭ .33), perceptual speed (r ϭ .31), word generation (r ϭ .29, p Ͻ .01), working memory (r ϭ .14, p Ͻ .05), word knowledge (r ϭ .04, p ϭ .59), and visuospatial ability (r ϭ .02).
Covariation in Rates of Change Across Domains
To see how change in one domain was related to change in other domains, we constructed a random-effects model (with a term for time) for each cognitive domain measure, estimated the personspecific slopes in each domain, and then computed the correlations among the slopes (see Table 5 ). The correlations ranged from .37 to .78, with a median of .54 (all ps Ͻ .01). We then submitted the slopes from each domain to a principal-components factor analysis. Each measure loaded on a single factor that accounted for 61.6% of the variance among the slopes (see Table 5 ).
To determine whether the correlation between rates of change depended on age, we constructed another set of random-effects models with terms for age, time, and their interaction; estimated the slopes in each cognitive domain; and then repeated the factor analysis. Results were similar to the initial analysis, with each cognitive domain measure loading on a single factor that accounted for 56.3% of the variance, suggesting that age per se was not responsible for the observed covariation. Figures 3 and 4 show that the cognitive test performance of some participants improved over the study period. To determine the extent to which improvement reflected a practice effect, we constructed another set of random-effects models (see Table 6 , Model 1). Each model had terms for time, for the contrast between the baseline and all subsequent evaluations (to assess the average effect of having experienced the testing at baseline), and for the contrast between the first follow-up and all subsequent follow-up evaluations (to assess the additional average effect of the first follow-up testing experience). The baseline term was significant (and negative) for each cognitive domain measure, consistent with the idea that the baseline testing experience slightly boosted performance on follow-up evaluations. The first follow-up term was significant (and negative) for three of the cognitive measures (word generation, perceptual speed, and visuospatial ability), suggesting that the second testing experience also boosted subsequent performance, though effects were less than those associated with the baseline testing experience. We added a second follow-up term in another set of analyses (data not shown). It was significant (and negative) for only two of the cognitive measures (word generation and perceptual speed), suggesting that the benefit of practice gradually diminished and varied somewhat among cognitive measures.
Practice Effects
To see how practice affected our estimates of the mean annual change in each measure, we compared the effects of time in the 
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aforementioned analyses with the effects of time in another set of models that did not include terms for baseline or follow-up (see Table 6 , Model 2). In each cognitive domain, the average decline per year (as shown by the estimate for time) was greater in Model 1 than in Model 2, indicating that our estimates of the average rate of decline over the full study period were reduced somewhat by the tendency of participants to improve over the initial evaluations. That is, accounting for practice in the model increased our estimate of the average annual rate of decline in each domain.
To see whether practice contributed to the association between rates of change in different abilities, we submitted the personspecific slopes estimated from Model 1 to a principal-components factor analysis. Results were similar to previous analyses, with each cognitive measure loading on a single factor that accounted for 61.8% of the variance. To see whether practice affected the association of initial level of function with rate of change, we computed the correlations between the intercepts and the slopes from Model 1. The correlations, which ranged from .00 to .51 (median r ϭ .27), were similar to those from random-effects models that included a term only for time.
Discussion
In this study, we examined change in cognitive abilities over a 6-year period in a large cohort of Catholic clergy who were 65 years and older and free of clinical evidence of Alzheimer's disease at baseline. There were three main findings. First, there was substantial heterogeneity in individual rates of change over the study period. Some persons declined sharply in cognition, some declined gradually, and many others stayed the same or improved. Second, we found that baseline level of function in a given cognitive domain accounted for a relatively modest amount of the Note. Model 1 contained three terms, and Model 2 contained one term (time). CI ϭ confidence interval. a The baseline term is for the contrast between the baseline and all subsequent evaluations; the follow-up term is for the contrast between the first follow-up and all subsequent evaluations. b The 95% CI is the range within which the true value of the parameter is 95% likely to be. variability in rates of change in that domain. Third, rates of change in different cognitive domains were moderately correlated; that is, individuals who were declining in one domain were likely to be declining in other domains as well. Overall, the results suggest that change in cognitive function in old age is highly specific to the individual.
Wide individual variation in paths of cognitive change has been previously reported (Christensen et al., 1999; Hultsch et al., 1998; Wilson et al., 1999) . It is especially noteworthy in the present study because the detailed cognitive function histories available on participants made it possible to reliably characterize individual patterns of change in diverse domains of cognitive function. The observed heterogeneity in rates of change is not easily reconciled with the idea that cognitive ability declines inevitably or uniformly in old age as part of some developmental process. The results are more consistent with the accumulation of common age-related conditions that can affect multiple cognitive systems, for instance, Alzheimer's disease (Haxby et al., 1990; Wilson et al., 2000) and cerebrovascular disease (Rockwood et al., 2000; Zhu et al., 1998) . More definitive conclusions about the bases of age-related change in cognitive function will require better understanding of how disease is related to person-specific change in cognition and how environmental and genetic factors modify this association. Because all participants in this study have agreed to brain donation at the time of death, we will have the opportunity to examine the relation of disease pathology to person-specific change in cognitive function.
Given that individuals in this cohort are changing substantially but at varying rates, an important issue becomes the extent to which baseline level of function can predict change. Previous longitudinal research provides little information about the association of initial level of cognition with rate of change (Alder, Adam, & Arenberg, 1990; Wilson et al., 1999) , in part because most studies have only two data points, making it difficult to disentangle starting level from change. Another issue is that floor and ceiling effects distort the association of initial level with change. As a result, initial level of function has often been viewed only as a source of error in estimating change rather than as an additional source of information about how people change (Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Rogosa, 1988) . In this cohort, we found that initial level of cognitive function was associated with rate of change, but not strongly so. Thus, the person-specific intercepts accounted for less than 11% of the variance in the person-specific slopes in each domain except story retention, for which the shared variance was approximately 28%. In a previous study of a population-based sample of older persons, Wilson et al. (1999) found a similar correlation (r ϭ .36) between baseline score on a global cognitive measure and rate of change over 3.5 years of follow-up. More research on this complex issue is needed, but these results suggest that cross-sectional data can provide a relatively limited amount of information about individual differences in rate of cognitive change in old age.
A long-standing question about cognitive function in old age is whether age affects cognitive abilities in a global or selective fashion, or to quote Rabbitt (1993) , "Does it all go together when it goes?" (p. 385). Most research on this issue has been crosssectional, but our finding that individual differences at a given point in time are not strongly related to individual differences in change casts doubt on this approach. Unfortunately, as reviewed above, longitudinal evidence about covariation in rates of change in different cognitive abilities is sparse and contradictory. In this study, all forms of cognitive function declined during the 6 years of observation, which is generally consistent with previous longitudinal studies in this age range with at least 5 years of observation and multiple cognitive outcomes (e.g., Hultsch et al., 1998; Schaie, 1996) . Rates of decline in different cognitive domains were moderately correlated and loaded on a single factor in a principalcomponents analysis, and in secondary analyses, these findings were not explained by age or practice effects. These results are similar to those obtained in the Victoria Longitudinal Study using structural equation modeling with composite cognitive measures (Hultsch et al., 1998) . By contrast, two studies that used individual tests as outcomes did not find rates of change to be correlated (Giambra et al., 1995; Taylor et al., 1992) . Further research is needed, but we think it is likely that change in cognition in old age is mostly global and that the negative results obtained by Giambra et al. and Taylor et al. reflect the psychometric limitations of individual cognitive tests as outcomes in longitudinal studies.
On average, performance on cognitive function tests benefited from previous experience, or practice, with the tests, consistent with prior studies with retest intervals of 1 year or longer (Dikmen et al., 1999; Hultsch et al., 1998; Jacqmin-Gadda et al., 1997; Mitrushina & Satz, 1991; Paolo, Troster, & Ryan, 1997; S. A. Small, Stern, Tang, & Mayeux, 1999; Unger et al., 1999) . Most of the effect in this cohort was seen following the initial experience with the tests (at baseline). Lower levels of benefit were also seen on a subset of measures after the first and second follow-up evaluations. It is likely, therefore, that the observed levels of decline in cognitive test performance underestimate the actual levels of decline in the abilities being measured.
Because the effects of practice, like those of age and time, are probably heterogenous, practice also has the potential to affect individual differences in rate of change. However, because the ability to benefit from practice is probably related to level of cognitive function, it seems unlikely that practice would substantially diminish individual differences in rates of change. We found no evidence in this cohort that practice affected the covariation in rates of change in different domains or the association of initial level of function and rate of change within domains.
Rate of cognitive change was related to age, consistent with longitudinal population-based studies of older persons (e.g., Brayne et al., 1995; Colsher & Wallace, 1991; Evans et al., 1993; Izaks et al., 1995; Wilson et al., 1999) . In each cognitive domain, older persons experienced more cognitive decline than younger persons. In story retention, for example, the score of an average 65-year-old person improved 0.05 units per year, compared with an annual loss of 0.03 units in the average 75-year-old participant and an annual loss of 0.11 units in the average 85-year-old participant. This nonlinear increase in the average rate of decline with advancing age contrasts with the linear association of age with cognitive function at baseline in this study. The latter result suggests that the range of cognitive function in this cohort may have been somewhat restricted at baseline, perhaps reflecting a healthy volunteer effect or the exclusion of those individuals with dementia at baseline. It is likely, therefore, that the cross-sectional results also underestimate the overall level of age-associated cognitive decline in this cohort.
Several features of the present study are notable. First, on the basis of a standard clinical evaluation and application of widely accepted criteria, persons with clinical evidence of Alzheimer's disease or other forms of dementia were identified at baseline and excluded from analyses. Second, follow-up participation in survivors was very high, greatly reducing the chance that attrition could bias estimates of change. Third, composites of two or more individual cognitive function tests were used as outcomes, reducing the opportunity for floor and ceiling effects and other sources of measurement error to distort estimates of change. Fourth, multiple domains of cognitive function were assessed, making it possible to compare age effects across domains. Fifth, there was an average of more than five evenly spaced observations per person, which made it possible to reliably characterize change in individuals.
These findings have important limitations. First, because the cohort was selected, results may not generalize to other groups. On average, participants differed from older people in the U.S. population in education (with an average of more than 18 years of schooling) and lifestyle (all members of the Catholic clergy), and perhaps in other ways as well. Although this homogeneity may have helped to highlight age-associated effects, it is unlikely that the full spectrum of cognitive function was represented at baseline, and it is possible that heterogeneity in rates of change was also underestimated. Longitudinal cognitive function studies of more diverse cohorts are needed. Second, it is uncertain how to best construct composite cognitive function measures for longitudinal analyses. We based decisions on how to group individual tests on baseline data alone because we wanted to assess covariation in change in different functions and felt that our ability to do so might be compromised if follow-up data were used to guide grouping decisions. We acknowledge, however, that longitudinal data can be used to determine groupings and that such an approach might yield different results. Further research on this issue is needed. Third, a longer period of observation would improve our ability to characterize individual paths of change in cognitive function, especially gradual or nonlinear patterns.
